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In 2007 and 2008, the African Union (AU) adopted two protocols that are significant for 
economic integration in Africa. These are the Protocol on the Relations between the African 
Union and the Regional Economic Communities [Protocol on Relations]
1
 and the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights [Protocol on the African Court 
of Justice].
2
 The former aims at addressing a difficult problem with Africa’s economic 
integration, which is, the existence of multiple regional economic integration organisations 
with overlapping memberships, and no clear principles of co-ordination among them. The 
latter establishes a court with jurisdiction over issues that potentially encompass those arising 
under the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community [AEC Treaty].
3
 The AEC 
Treaty is the foundation of an attempt to create an economic community covering the whole 
of Africa - a continent with 53 sovereign states. If successful, the African Economic 
Community will be the largest economic integration organisation (in terms of membership) in 
the world. 
The adoption of the Protocol on Relations and the Protocol on the African Court of 
Justice provides an auspicious moment to examine a fundamental question: what is the 
relationship between the AU, Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) and the 
African Economic Community (AEC)? This is a complex question, which has so far not 
received any systematic examination in the discourse on Africa’s economic integration.4 
Finding answers to the question and clarifying the relationship are important for the success 
of economic integration in Africa. This paper aims to put up this issue for serious discussion 
and research. 
II. THE AEC AND AFRICA’S RECs 
In 1994, the AEC Treaty entered into force. The treaty envisages the creation of an African 
Economic Community over a period of thirty four years using six defined stages of 
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 Rather than start from scratch, the AEC uses existing RECs as the building blocks 
of the African Economic Community.
6
 In other words, progress by the RECs is progress for 
the AEC and a step closer to the African Economic Community. In the words of article 88(1) 
of the AEC Treaty, the African Economic Community ‘shall be established mainly through 
the co-ordination, harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of [RECs]’.7 
The RECs are ultimately to merge or be absorbed
8
 to form the African Economic 
Community. This is a unique and quite complicated approach to economic integration. 
Usually, countries form economic communities – free trade areas, customs union, economic 
unions, or complete economic integration. Indeed, to date, it appears the only known case of 
a successful ‘merger’ of RECs was the merger of the European Community with the 
European Free Trade Area to form the European Economic Area.
9
 A more recent attempt is 
the Union of South American Nations
10
 which is a free trade zone that unites the Common 
Market of the Southern Cone and the Andean Community. 
Remarkably, although the REC’s are the building blocks of the African Economic 
Community, they are not members of AEC or parties to the AEC Treaty. It is the individual 
African states which are parties to the AEC Treaty and the treaties creating the RECs. Indeed, 
states are often parties to more than one REC. These raise complex questions. To what extent 
are the RECs bound by decisions of the AEC? Since the RECs, which have their own legal 
personality, are not parties to the AEC Treaty, what is the legal basis for assuming that they 
will merge and form the African Economic Community? Indeed, it is difficult to predict 
whether the RECs would willingly merge with the AEC.  One may also query whether the 
AEC has the will or legitimacy to impose its vision of an African Economic Community on 
the RECs.
11
 If they were to merge and form the African Economic Community, what will be 
                                                     
5
 In a sense, the African Economic Community both is and is to be! Understandably, this may sound confusing 
to a reader. In this note the ‘AEC’ is used to refer to the current organization irrespective of the stage in its 
development, and reference to the ultimate stage of the AEC is written in full as ‘the African Economic 
Community’. 
6
 In 2006, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union suspended, until further notice, 
the recognition of new RECs with the exception of the following eight: Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community 
(EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Southern African Development Community 
(SADC); Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and; Economic 
Community of Sahelo-Saharian States (CENSAD). See African Union, Decision on the Moratorium on the 
Recognition of Regional Economic Communities, Assembly/AU/ Dec.112 (VII), 2006. [RECs Moratorium 
Decision]. 
7
 Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, 13 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (2005): 25, also underscores the need to ‘coordinate and harmonize the policies between 
existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the 
[African] Union’. Indeed, this is described as an ‘objective’ of the Union. It is worth noting that under article 
88(2) of the AEC Treaty, it was the AEC (not the Organization of African Unity [now African Union] that was 
entrusted with the co-ordination, harmonisation and evaluation of the activities of existing and future regional 
economic communities. 
8
 Protocol on Relations, supra note 1 art. 5(1)(d). 
9
 See K. Riechenberg, ‘The Merger of Trading Blocks and the Creation of the European Economic Area: Legal 
and Judicial Issues’, 4 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law (1995): 63. 
10
 It consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. The treaty establishing the Union was signed on 23 May 2008. 
11
 Equally important will be the AEC’s ability to finance the cost of the merger. 
3 
 
the legal status of the REC’s after the merger?12  None of these questions is effectively 
addressed in the Protocol on Relations. 
Nor do the founding treaties of the RECs shed any brighter light on these issues. For 
example, the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
13
 
envisages the conversion of COMESA into an organic entity of the African Economic 
Community.
14
 This appears to suggest that COMESA does not envision the formation of the 
African Economic Community as its demise. However, the treaty provides that the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government may, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, 
terminate the operations of the COMESA.
15
 This suggests that a legal mandate exists for 
bringing COMESA to an end, if that is what will be needed after the formation of the African 
Economic Community. Neither the Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of 
West African State
16
  nor the Treaty establishing the East African Community
17
 contains any 
provision directly relevant to their status after the formation of the African Economic 
Community.  
The RECs’ treaties were drafted after the AEC Treaty. Therefore, one would have 
expected that they will address the issues of their relations with the AEC and of their status 
after the formation of the African Economic Community more comprehensively and, 
perhaps, uniformly. As organizations created by treaties, the state parties retain an inherent 
right to terminate the treaty
18
 if that is what will be needed for them to form the African 
Economic Community. As the RECs are progressing further on the stages of integration, the 
merger issue should engage the AEC’s attention.  
Indeed, I would suggest that negotiating a merger protocol should start now given the 
complexity and size of the undertaking. It should address inter alia issues relating to: the 
post-merger legal status of the RECs; their assets and liabilities after the merger; whether the 
merger is compulsory or voluntary and, if compulsory, how that is going to be enforced; 
when the merger is to occur (simultaneously for all the RECs or incrementally after each 
reaches the needed stage of integration); the status of their personnel; and the status of active 
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RECs, such as the Southern African Customs Union, which have not been recognized as 
building blocks of the AEC.  
The anticipated merger of the RECs raises other issues. Some, like the EAC, are at an 
advanced stage of development. It is difficult to predict whether they would willingly merge 
with their less progressive counterparts such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development. It is also arguable whether a merger of the RECs will be supported by interest 
groups within the RECs. Public choice theorists characterise international organisations as 
bureaucracies that are more responsive to the demands of organised interest groups, including 
their staff.  As Vaubel notes, ‘like all bureaucracies, international organizations fight for their 
survival and for more powers and resources. Thus, it is more difficult to abolish an 
international organization than to establish it, or to reduce its powers and resources than to 
increase them’.19 Indeed, already, an appreciable number of staff cases have appeared before 
the courts set up by the various RECs, an evidence of people trying to protect their ‘turf’.20 
The number of staff cases, and the tenacity with which they appear to have been pursued, 
lend some credence to Rasul’s thesis that economic integration has become a job generating 
venture for Africa’s educated elite,21 and raise the prospect of obstructionist litigation before 
and during the merger. 
Additionally, the RECs are legal systems in their own right. Unlike the AEC, they are 
expressly endowed with separate legal personality.
22
 Accordingly, even before the merger, 
there is the need to structure and manage the relations between the AEC and the RECs’ legal 
systems as well as among the RECs. The Protocol on Relations does not go far in addressing 
these complicated relational issues   
Effectively and boldly addressing the problems resulting from multiple memberships and 
the troubling relational issues between the AEC and the RECs, and among the RECs, will 
require legal imagination, economic thought, and strong institutional and political will. There 
is the urgent need for the AEC to actively rationalise the relations among the RECs and 
between the RECs and itself.
23
 This is important for the development of the African 
Economic Community. The 2006 AU moratorium on the establishment and recognition of 
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more RECs was an important first step.
24
 So far, it has been heeded. I suggest that another 
important step will be for the AEC to adopt a protocol founded on a ‘one country-one 
community membership’ of the eight AU recognised RECs principle. With the help of 
national institutions and commissioned experts, countries should be guided to decide based 
on predominately economic criteria, which RECs best suits their needs taking into account 
the fact that the ultimate realization of the vision of an African Economic Community may 
help address some of their needs. This should not be viewed as an inappropriate infringement 
on state sovereignty, but as a measure needed for effectively pooling state sovereignty for a 
common good. 
Indeed, the legal foundation for such as protocol can be sought in article 5(1) of the AEC 
Treaty. In it, member states undertook to ‘create favourable conditions for the development 
of the Community and the attainment of its objectives, particularly by harmonising their 
strategies and policies’, and to ‘refrain from any unilateral action that may hinder the 
attainment of the said objectives’. I argue that the unilateral decision of AEC member states 
to be members of multiple RECs creates unfavourable conditions for the development of the 
AEC.  
Admittedly, getting support for and enforcing this protocol will be difficult. It will be the 
ultimate test not only of the enforcement powers of the AEC, but also of member states’ 
commitment to the realisation of its vision beyond their political rhetoric of support. Non-
complying states should be threatened with expulsion and ultimately expelled from the AEC 
and all but one of the RECs to which they are members.
25
 I dare say that the vision of an 
African Economic Community should not be founded on the ideal of all African countries as 
members. The European Community does not consist of all states in Europe. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement covers less than all countries on the North American 
continent. And the World Trade Organization comprises less than all the countries of the 
world. There is no legitimate reason why an African Economic Community cannot consist of 
something less than all of Africa! For a continent consisting of 53 state, a few of them 
dysfunctional, collapsed or collapsing, and many with different levels of socio-economic, 
legal and political development, the pursuit of this ideal will delay, indeed, thwart the timely 
realization of a noble economic vision.  
Writing in the context of the collapse of the OAU, Professor Kufuor perceptively 
observed that ‘unrestricted access in the form of virtually no entry requirements led to the 
tragedy of the regional commons, the degrading of the OAU as an organization of any 
value’.26 Won’t the stature, integrity and effectiveness of the OAU/AU have been enhanced if 
it consisted of say twenty democratic, human rights respecting, socially and economically 
developed states which extend the benefits of the organisation to non-members on defined 
conditions? Like Professor Kufuor, I argued here that Africa’s economic integration is being 
devalued, delayed and diluted due to the fact that countries are able to sign up at will without 
strict prior defined and continuous commitments to implementation. An African Economic 
Community which consists of a few African states can extend through conditioned 
agreements the benefits of integration to other countries that need not necessary be its 
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 The expansion of economic space need not be a concomitant of the expansion of 
institutional space. 
The ‘one country-one community membership’ principle should be combined with the 
full integration of the RECs into the legal framework of the AEC by making them members. 
It is unfortunate that neither the Protocol of Relations between the African Economic 
Community and the Regional Economic Communities, nor the new Protocol of Relations 
does this.
28
 For the RECs to become members of the AEC there should be an amendment to 
the AEC Treaty. Currently, the AEC Treaty does not have a membership provision or 
criterion, but it appears to assume all African state as potential members.
29
 By becoming fully 
signed up members of the AEC, the RECs will be bound by all AEC laws, including laws 
which aim at rationalizing and co-ordinating their activities. They will become subject to 
AEC enforcement processes and active and interested participants in its decision making 
process. This will help in the elimination or at least minimise of potential conflict of laws, 
policies and jurisdiction. 
III. THE AU AND THE AEC 
As if the above was not complex enough, another leg must be added to this bizarre web of 
legal relations on the path to Africa’s economic integration. This is the OAU (now AU) leg. 
Africans have long aspired to be politically united. The OAU was a first step towards this 
goal. However, economic integration and political unification are two distinct ideas. These 
two ideas should not be convoluted. They need not be pursued together. Indeed, the former is 
definitely achievable without the latter. In my opinion, a principal problem with economic 
integration in Africa is the non-realisation of this truth.
30
 In Africa, there has been a 
convolution of these two ideas. This convolution of ideas has led to an inappropriate 
structuring and fusion of institutions, which ultimately ill-serve the objectives of economic 
integration.  
For the AEC, the problem of mixing the economic with the political began when its 
founding treaty declared in article 98(1) that ‘the Community shall form an integral part of 
the [Organisation of African Unity]’.31 Article 99 went on to declare that the treaty and 
protocols adopted under it shall form an integral part of the OAU Charter. With these 
provisions, it appears the drafters thought it unnecessary to expressly give the AEC a separate 
legal personality; accordingly, the treaty is silent on this issue.
32
 What was meant by ‘an 
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integral part’ was not defined. But the immediate effect of these provisions was that the 
institutions or organs of the OAU were co-opted to perform the functions of the institutions 
established by the AEC Treaty. There appears to have been no careful thought as to whether, 
as then structured, the OAU institutions suited the needs of economic integration. The 
Constitutive Act of the African Union
33
 did not address this problem. After passing 
references to the African Economic Community in the preamble, it simply provided that the 
‘Act shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the 
[AEC Treaty]’.  
Historically and comparatively, it is worth recalling that the Treaty for East African Co-
operation
34
 which established the East African Community had ‘as an integral part of the 
Community’35 the East African Common Market. However, unlike the situation with the 
AEC, the Treaty for East African Co-operation established at least two institutions devoted 
specifically to the common market, namely the Common Market Council and Common 
Market Tribunal.
36
 More recently, Professor Asante has decried the use of the organs of the 
OAU (now AU) as the basic organs of the AEC.
37
 These organs are ill-equipped to meet the 
challenges of integration. The effect of this fusion of institutions has been the loss of identity 
of the AEC. Indeed, as he graphically puts it, the AEC has no ‘letterhead of its own’, it ‘has, 
in fact become just a division, albeit an important one, of a continental political institution’.38 
In his view, which I endorse, ‘the AEC surely requires distinct and separate institutional 
arrangements’.39 The African Court of Justice is, perhaps, the best example of the 
inappropriateness of the convolution of institutional roles. 
The Court of Justice of the AEC
40
 was to be an important institution for the enforcement 
of AEC law.  It was to be independent of all the other community institutions. Its mandate 
was to ‘ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of [the AEC Treaty] 
and shall decide on disputes submitted thereto pursuant to [the AEC Treaty]’.41  The detailed 
law regulating the court was to be set out in a protocol. But, it appears that this distinct court 
devoted to economic integration issues will never be established. Its functions will now be 
performed by the African Court of Justice and Human Rights [African Court of Justice].
42
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The African Court of Justice consists of sixteen judges who must all be nationals of states 
that are parties to the Protocol on the African Court of Justice.
43
   
The subject matter jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice is broad. In theory, it 
covers potentially any international dispute arising between states which are parties to the 
Protocol of the African Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice, as 
outlined in article 28 of the Statute on the African Court of Justice, is wide enough to cover 
the AEC Treaty and any laws adopted by the AEC.  
The strength of a court depends not only on its independence and subject matter but also 
it personal jurisdiction. Under article 29 of the Statute of the African Court of Justice, the 
following entities are entitled to submit cases to the court on ‘any issue or dispute’44 provided 
for in article 28:  states that are parties to the Protocol of the African Court of Justice; the 
Assembly; the Parliament and other organs of the AU authorised by the Assembly; and a staff 
member of the AU.  A state that is not party to the protocol may not submit a case to the 
African Court of Justice;
45
 the court has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute involving such a 
party. Equally, it does not appear that the RECs, the building blocks of the AEC, have 
standing before the court. 
The fact that the court has no jurisdiction over states that are not parties to the protocol, 
even though they may be parties to the AEC Treaty, poses a challenge to judicial enforcement 
of the treaty. Surely, under traditional international law, states, as an attribute of their 
sovereignty cannot be dragged to an international tribunal without their consent. But, in the 
context of regional economic integration,
46
 this jurisdictional gap will not aid the uniform 
application and enforcement of community law within member states.  In my opinion, this 
jurisdictional gap is a reflection of inattention to the importance of legal issues in integration. 
A foundation for instability is laid where uneven obligations, in terms of the enforcement and 
enforceability of community law, are imposed on member states.  It is difficult to conceive of 
a stable and effective economic community where community law is not uniformly 
applicable within and enforceable against member states.  Indeed, the very essence of 
integration is defeated; ‘uniformity in the meaning of law is part of the constitutional glue 
that holds the Community together’.47 
Individuals also have an important role to play in economic integration, not least in 
ensuring the implementation of community laws. For example, the COMESA, EAC, 
ECOWAS and SADC treaties provide fairly liberal rules on individuals’ participation in the 
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communities’ judicial processes. Indeed, to date, individuals have been responsible for almost 
the entire disputes settled by their respective courts.
48
 The Statute of the African Court of 
Justice adopts a radically different approach. Except for human rights claims, individuals 
have no standing before the African Court of Justice. On matters relating to the interpretation, 
enforcement and validity of AEC laws, individuals cannot bring an action in the African 
Court of Justice. A provision in the earlier Protocol on the Court of Justice of the African 
Union,
49
 which allowed individuals to access the court under conditions determined by the 
Assembly and with the consent of the state concerned, has been omitted from the Statute on 
the African Court of Justice. Accordingly, the African Court of Justice resembles the 
international adjudication regime category in Schneider’s typology of dispute settlement 
systems.
50
 Such a regime is ill-suited for the level of integration envisaged under the AEC 
Treaty, although it may adequately serve the needs of the AU – the political organisation.51 
The absence of locus standi for individuals restricts the number of potential disputes that 
may be brought to the African Court of Justice.  It makes the dispute settlement process 
unavailable to some of the most important players in the integration process, including 
consumers, traders, corporate bodies, and investors. It fails to utilise a principal medium 
through which community-state relationship is strengthened in economic integration. A 
plausible solution, which is still more restricting compared to the standing rules of COMESA, 
EAC and ECOWAS courts, will be to allow individuals to litigate before the African Court of 
Justice with the special leave of the court,
52
 or after exhausting local remedies. Another 
option is to create a reference procedure between national courts and the African Court of 
Justice. This alternative will provide individuals with an indirect access to the court. 
In general, governments are reluctant to submit to binding interstate dispute resolution 
processes. Indeed, of all the cases so far brought before the COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS and 
SADC courts only one involved inter-state parties.
53
 In the absence of individual standing, 
the African Court of Justice might be underused and may be consigned to ‘abject inactivity 
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and irrelevance’,54as far as economic integration issues are concerned. One can only imagine 
what would have happened to the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC courts if individuals did 
not have standing before them. Granting private right of action will ensure the use of the 
African Court of Justice, and prevent its descent into inactivity and irrelevance.   
Arguably, the absence of individual rights of action reflects a desire of states to dominate 
the African Court of Justice, even if only indirectly, and cut off the court from any relations 
with those most affected by economic integration.  The absence of individual standing is 
inconsistent with the position in other African regional economic treaties.  It is recommended 
that any revisions of the Statute of the African Court of Justice should provide for individual 
standing either directly, with special leave of the court or after exhausting local remedies, or 
indirectly through reference from national courts.
55
 
Perhaps, if the distinct identity of the AEC had been maintained and its economic 
integration agenda and the concomitant needs of the agenda held in focus, these shortfalls 
might have been avoided. As a court for the political organization, the AU, it is 
unproblematic; its structure and jurisdiction closely resemble the International Court of 
Justice of the United Nations. But, as a court which also has jurisdiction over economic 
integration issues, its structure and jurisdiction are highly inadequate. To my knowledge, it is 
the only court with jurisdiction over an economic integration agreement whose jurisdiction is 
not compulsory. A party to the AEC Treaty which has not ratified the Protocol of the African 
Court of Justice is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
56
 As has been argued above, this 
will seriously affect the application and enforcement of AEC law. Individuals and national 
courts, key players in the success of any economic integration agenda have no direct or 
indirect relations with the courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the AU, AEC and Africa’s RECs is complex. I attribute this to two 
factors. Firstly, there appears to be a lackadaisical approach to the legal aspects of the 
economic integration being undertaking under the aegis of the AEC. It does not appear that 
treaties and protocols are adopted with much careful thought on the complex legal issues 
involved in economic integration. It is the hope of this writer that the newly established 
African Union Commission on International Law
57
 will devote considerable space on its 
agenda to the legal aspects of economic integration on the continent. Secondly, there has been 
a convolution of the two distinct ideas namely economic integration and political unification. 
This has led to approaches to issues, including the establishment of institutions, that ill-serve 
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the needs of integration. African lawyers and legal academics are culpable in this state of 
affairs. The extent to which both groups have taken interest the economic integration agenda 
is doubtful.
58
 This fact is reflected in the small number of books, journal and articles dealing 
with the legal aspects of economic integration in Africa.
59
 If Africa’s economic integration is 
to succeed, its legal aspects has to be taken more seriously and it should be clearly divorced 
from the political unification agenda. Admittedly, the socio-economic and political 
challenges that bedevil Africa’s economic integration are enormous and real. However, in my 
opinion even if all these challenges were to disappear, there are so much in the realm of law 
which, if unaddressed, will still hinder the success and effectiveness of economic integration 
in Africa. 
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